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I. The Union of the Future
Majority and Minority
How much chance exists for the survival of ethnic minorities in the Europe of
the 21st century in the form of communities of cultural units? What kind of
European Union are we going to have?
And what sort of technical-communication culture are we going to possess
in the 21st century?
How will the territorial administrative system of the European Union be
shaped and how will the contours of the current state-administrative organs
within territorial administrations be organized and what sort of functions will
they perform? These are questions that we raise for ourselves when thinking
about the future course of European integration. The questions are there for
sure, the answers are not.
The current state-administrations will definitely lose their omnipotence in
the European Union since part of their power will be transferred to larger units
of territorial administration (to the Union) in foreign affairs, military and finan-
cial matters. However, the national character of administration within the
member states will persist in everyday affairs; after all, every banking trans-
action, the overall organization of armed forces, not to speak of local govern-
ments, will have to be conducted in the national language. Similarly, local
schooling, trades, maternal registry, the organization of production will also
continue to be performed in the national language.
Then come further questions: Will it be possible to speak of national
minorities in today’s terms in such a state of reduced sovereignty? After all, the
concept of “minorities” can be perceived only in relation to the majority living in
a given state. In the Union that will be a large territorial unit, everyone will be in
a “minority!”
In any case, will the new administrative system strengthen or weaken the
self-identification of the individual with the nation? If the answer is yes to the
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first part of the question, will the integration strengthen the consciousness of
national unity only for the majority nation or will that of the “minorities” also be
strengthened by it? Speaking in concrete terms, will the weakening of the
administrative role of the Hungarian national state in the European Union of the 21st
century mean that the non-Hungarian nationalities living in that state will not be
required to learn only the Hungarian language? For instance, will the framework
of the Union be useful for Slovaks living in Hungary? Theoretically, it will be
irrelevant for them that they, Slovaks, live in a Union-member Hungary or in a
Union-member Slovakia.
Or are we going to be required to define the concepts of “minorities” and
“majorities” in regional terms? Are we going to use these terms in the sense of
majority and minority languages existing in a given region? Then, another question
must be raised, namely, if Hungarians will comprise a majority in a Slovakian
region, let us say in the Ipolyság, will the Hungarian language constitute the
majority language there and the Slovak language will be that of the minority?
These are questions that the future will have to answer…
In any case, we must begin thinking about the concepts of minorities and
majorities.
Consciousness and Citizenship in the Union
We cannot avoid considering the following questions: “Will there emerge a
concept of Union citizenship?” Will there be an identification of the individual
with the Union? How will such a concept relate to a European identity? After all,
the European Union – as a territorial administrative unit – will never be identical
with the concept of Europe as a geographical or cultural area. In other words, a
European identity will not necessarily be the same as a European Union identity.
How will a Union identity relate to the individual’s identification with citizen-
ship in a state or other – regional or other territorial community – identification? And
how will all this relate to the identification of the individual as a citizen and as a member
of a nation? The latter of this does not necessarily mean identification with a unit of
territorial administration! After all, members of a nation may live in several areas in
separate groups (even in geographically distant regions). The way Hungarians live in
Transylvania, in the Székely lands, far from Hungary’s borders and equally far from
their co-nationals living in Kolozsvár located in the centre of Transylvania itself. Not to
speak of those Hungarians who live in diasporas disseminated, from America to various
other states in the world. The same can be said of the Poles or of of the latter live 200
kilometres distant from the main Slovak groups in southern Hungary. (It has been long
known that a significant group of ethnic Slovaks has been living in that area since the
18th century who are – at least in my mind – members of the Slovak nation living
in the territory of the Hungarian state.)
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Free Movement, Integration, Identity
There is already a common currency, the Euro, and common policies have also
been introduced, such as in agriculture and environmental protection. Common poli-
cies regulating transportation will certainly be established and it is also certain that
common security practices and jurisprudence, as well as regulations in areas of busi-
ness life, will emerge. These will all be significant steps toward the integration of
territorial administration. However, we are unable to discover the “human dimen-
sions” of the Union’s framework. Hardly any thought is given to the freedom of
human migrations. (We do not like to discuss this issue since it might conflict with
the interests of the labour market of national states.) I consider it unthinkable to
introduce any sort of restriction on the movement of labour within the European
Union. In fact, one of the advantages – if not the greatest – of the Union, in con-
trast to those of the national states, is the size of the market; this includes free
movement of products and expertise on a large scale.
If a European-scale migration emerges, the consequences will be the spread
of diverse ethnic-national groups scattered all over the Union. People will become
more citizens of Europe and less citizens of the nation states. It is likely that Hungari-
ans will be scattered all over the member states of the Union, living on territories
of France, Germany, Holland, and so on. After a while there will be small ethnic
communities of Hungarians in these lands, the same way as Turkish and Cro-
atian groups are formed today or have been formed during the last 30 years. The
future citizens of the Union will chose a country according to whether in that spe-
cific locality purchasing power for their abilities or their expertise exists. They will
probably pay their taxes in that area as well. They will learn local languages and
assimilate at least partly local customs and habits. At the same time, they may
also retain their original national language and part of their customs.
Whose minorities will such communities be? They will be citizens of the Union
and, at the same time, also Hungarian minorities of the Union. The same process
will happen to the Hungarians of Slovakia; they will simply be “Hungarians”
living within the Union. Their citizenship will remain Slovak, and they will also
be European Union citizens. It is possible that their affinities as citizens of the
Union will increase at the expense of the Slovak one. The key question is, of
course, “will there be a Union citizenship?” And if there is a Union currency – as
indeed there is – will there be a Union income tax? In other words, the national
states (for example the Slovak state) shall not contribute a certain amount of
money to maintain the administration of the Union, however citizens living in
the Union shall pay their taxes directly to the Union? Union citizenship also
means that various civil societies and autonomies will consider themselves
minorities not in relation to the Slovak state but in relation to the inhabitants of
neighboring regions, the former majority populations, if their majority consists
of Slovaks.
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The “national-ethnic autonomy” will then accommodate itself to the
autonomies of the various other identities. These identities will exist and function as
long as the respective communities have a need for a separate consciousness of
these groups. In any case, the administrative systems of the Union will have to
consider a great many variations on this concept and must be prepared for the possibility
that any solution will provide new directions for the organization of the Union’s
communities. These communities will modify by their very existence the
frameworks of territorial administrations.
Industrial-Technological Development, Plurality of Identities
and Self-Government
Let us consider another factor, namely, the industrial-technological development
of the 21st century. When we discuss the expected industrial-technological
development of the 21st century, we must first pose a question; “What sort of
changes can be expected in the culture of human communications by the
revolution in world computer chips?” I am convinced that the new culture of
communications will lead to the emergence of a new type of individualism. The
mass use of television, the emerging new internet-culture whose real impact
cannot yet be foreseen, electronic mailing service, the fact that everyone’s desk at
home will provide a view on the cultures of the world, the all-conquering
cellular telephone, are all pointing to such a direction. But the “new indivi-
dualism” – carrying with it certain dangers – will, hopefully, not lead to the
isolation of the individual, to his separation from others, but to the emergence of
a new consciousness of community which will be based on the individual’s
choice. Therefore, individualism will not mean isolation, but that people will select
their community relations and, alongside with it, their identity on an individual basis
that is, in a variety of ways. It means that the individual will experience his sense
of identity more deliberately. For instance, alongside his identity as a European
citizen (that will take first place), the ethnic-national-, age-, gender-, and
ideological identifications will be acting as forces for the cohesion of respective
groups. The consciousness of citizenship will continue to survive, but on a
different level; it will probably survive as a community of taxpayers.
Autonomies and Civil Associations
My forecast about the growth of the impact of civil associations in the 21st
century is based on the notion of the strengthening of the new type of indivi-
dualism. Civil associations are the self-management organs of citizens whose
importance is recognized by the community, the state, or the Union. If the
64
Union will consider the survival of a variety of ethnic and national groups
important, then it will finance from the common budget groups dedicated to
serving the maintenance of ethnic-national consciousness of the citizens. How-
ever, it can also happen that the Union would order the surviving national states
to finance the creation and maintenance of their respective ethnic-national
autonomous administrations.
The new individualism, this new social energy, is many-sided – possibly it
will constitute a new type of self-identification of the individual, and it will
create a set of new associations, new autonomies. The process may become a
foundation for the strengthening or establishment of new civil associations.
According to our definition, the very existence of civil associations that the
community recognizes calls for institutions of certain functions that do not
necessarily have to be integrated into the framework of state- or sector
administration. In such a case the state, or the European Union, ensures support
for the citizens, the taxpayers – from the budget – to freely form under the
condition that they perform a certain function within the community. There are
certain tasks that cannot be performed by the state or sector administrations.
Through such actions the weight of the executive power is reduced and the ratio
of the freely formed associations of citizens is increased. (For this process to
succeed there is the associations need for the emergence of a new type of
citizenry.)
I consider various ethnic autonomies to correspond to such civil associations. The
nation-state or the European Union will recognize that the masses of citizens
living on its territory will establish various kinds of autonomies organized in
several ways (including ethnic autonomies). Their rights will be enacted into
laws and, at the same time, they will be regulated or delimited in the areas of
their competence. The regulations will include funds derived from the budget –
that is, from the common purse – for the performance of functions to benefit the
respective association. An autonomous self-government for ethnic minorities could be
one form of a civil association in the 21st century. And since the desire of the citizens
for the freedom of association continues to increase – including organizations
based on ethnic identities –, the rise and strengthening of civil associations will
contribute to the increasing demand for the establishment of autonomous ethnic
self-governments.
Therefore, my conclusion is that in the coming decades the new
industrial-technical revolution will strengthen the recognition of self-realization and
the citizens’ need for the free exercise of these self-realizations and identities. All this
points to the fact that the consciousness of ethnic identities and autonomies,
organized on ethnic foundations, is going to undergo unforeseen changes in the
future.
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II. Europe and its Nations in the 21ST Century
I intended to illustrate — with my introductory questions and attempts at pro-
viding some partial answers – how much the future of the autonomous
national-ethnic self governments will depend on the territorial administrative
system of the continent and on the impact of the industrial-technological revolu-
tion. I would now like to describe some working hypotheses for consideration in
today’s discussions. The aim is to have our plans contrasted by realities.
1. Europe is a Continent of Ethnic Diversity
I believe that the future Europe will be a continent of ethnic diversity. More
exactly, it will be a place where the current ethnic varieties will continue to exist.
National cultures will be freely renewed, or will equally freely disappear.
The Union must ensure the possibility for this social-cultural evolution.
One of the unique characteristics of Europe has been the fact that two dozen
national cultures have existed and continue to exist on its territories, each
equipped with its own literature and system of customs embedded in its own
institutions. My surmise is that the enlargement of the Union will end the possibil-
ity of the suppression of ethnic-national differences or, conversely, their support by
means of government. In other words, ethnic-national identities may be spontane-
ously strengthened or weakened. One of the fundamental characteristics of the
Union could be that the exclusive rule of the majority nation in the administration will
come to an end and it will not be able to oppress the national minorities with the
power of the state (including the power of the administration of regions). My
other hunch is that national differences will not lead to wars. It will be necessary to
establish unified principles of policies for the ethnic groups living on the territories of
the Union. For the realization of this principle I consider it to be necessary that
the European Union, as well as lower levels of administration, leave the decision
up to individuals to decide on their own the ethnic-national identities.
2. About the Nature of National Identity, its Weakening and Strengthening
National identity is a phenomenon that is cultural-social in nature. It is manifest
in two areas of everyday life, namely, in a national language and a system of
customs.
A citizen considers his national identity important in certain periods of his
life and he places it before other – social, ideological, gender, and even family –
identities. In other periods of his life this feeling of community-creating becomes
weaker. It is also natural that the process should be different in each individual
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case; there are some people who consider national identity unimportant
throughout their lifespan, regardless of their use of a given mother tongue and
the acceptance of the set of rules of their community’s customs.
Therefore, the notion of belonging to a nation is a matter of the individual’s
conviction and a subjective feeling. Citizenship, even blood relations and age,
however, are administrative in nature, “objective,” and they are independent of the indi-
vidual’s choice. Belonging to a nation is simply a matter of declaration, that is subjective.
An individual may change his national identity. Tendencies that restrict such
changes are “excluding,” and have no place in the new Europe. Ethnic diversity
and exclusion are contradictory principles. (Of course, one may leave the
administrative framework of citizenship on a voluntary basis and we even
consider the Europe of the 21st century to become the community of individuals
possessing multiple citizenships.)
Let us now take a closer look at two areas of national identity, namely,
language and the systems of customs.
3. About Language Cultures in the 21st Century
There will probably be three levels of languages in the Europe of the 21st century;
one will be a world-language (probably English), the languages of respective
states (as long as state administrations will continue to exist, – perhaps even in
centuries-long perspective – these languages will survive) and the mother
tongue. The world-language, the lingua franca, will probably be English. In
addition, there will continue to exist regional lingua francas acquiring regional
“rank” from one of the state languages. (For instance, in the Near East this will
probably be Arabic, in the Far East Japanese or Chinese, and their various
dialects. In Central Europe, it will probably be German, in the former French col-
onies in Africa French, in Eastern Europe Russian and so on.) This will probably
be also the case in several occupations in which there may develop “professional
languages of transmission” besides English.
The question is: will the citizen of the 21st century’s Europe be able to acquire
knowledge of 2-3 languages? In other words, will he be able to learn, besides his
mother tongue, the language of the state that will not be necessarily the same?
And in addition will he learn another world language as a lingua franca and also
acquire a regional language or a language of his trade? Will the man of the 21st
century be able to operate jurisprudence, transportation and education by using
several languages (approved officially by the respective states)? Would it be
worth his energy to acquire so many languages simply in order to facilitate
everyday communications easier? In other words, would he be willing to spend
his intellectual abilities and resources on this endeavour instead of using them
for developing other abilities?
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Cultures of Customs in the 21st Century
Another area in the everyday life of ethnic-national communities concerns the
culture of customs. We understand under this term the sum of food consumption,
clothing and customs of behaviour. Today one can observe the use of many more
variations in the system of customs and habits than before. Modes of conduct may
even divert from ethnic-national lines. There may be citizens in Europe who speak
Hungarian as their mother tongue, but will follow French, Spanish, German,
Slovak, or Romanian customs in styles of clothing, behaviour, or even in
traditions of celebrating holidays. And this will be quite all right.
The strongest influences exerted on the system of habits within a culture are
climate and modes of conduct to overcome climatic challenges, such as clothing,
consumption of food, an individual’s position in production, and traditions of feelings.
Modernization in the twentieth century, globalization, free movement, the
discovery of ever newer cultures, the taking over of certain elements from such
new cultures and the new individualism will generally speaking not lead to the
disappearance of the diversity of culture-systems. The citizen will have the
chance to select his own system of culture more freely than it is the case today.
Yet, his possibilities will always be curtailed to some extent by the actual climate
and the natural environment, also general conditions set by the majority, or even
by the majority in society and the requirements of technology. After all, the
system of habits of people living near the North Pole, their ways of constructing
housing or their behaviour, their food culture, will always be different than, let
us say, the behaviour of people living near the Equator, just as the temper of
southern peoples, whose behaviour is closely related to opportunities provided
by the climate, will always be different from the behaviour of northern
populations.
The Use and Cultivation of the Language of the State
The framework for the survival of ethnic-national minorities, as we indicated
above, rests on the continued use of the national language and the system of
habits. The use of language and, less importantly, everyday communications
and relationships, are kept alive, in daily contacts since their survival depends
on their use. The maintenance and further development of the language and sys-
tem of habits is an appendage of the cultural institutions in daily life. Among
these institutions, however, family relations and customs are entirely of a private
matter. If the state prevents the improvement of the language of a minority, the
citizens belonging to this minority experience an emotional confrontation with
their own administrative system, and will be forced to consider that their chil-
dren will become handicapped compared to their peers, if they cannot acquire
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both languages. They also have to consider learning a third language, the
regional or the world-wide lingua franca. For 200 years – since we have been living
under modern administrative systems in Europe – the ever renewed political controver-
sies have revolved around the use of the mother tongue in dealing with administration;
over the language of education, of administration of trades and professions. It is well
known to researchers that the survival of minorities in the 19th-20th centuries
depended on their right to use their language in dealing with administrative
offices.
The use of the mother tongue is a human right, and it is not only individual
persons, but also language - and national communities that are its subjects. It is
a collective right. Freedom of opportunity must be ensured for the individual
regardless of birth, or the place of one’s position in production (society), but also
in terms of his right to use the mother tongue. This is a fundamental principle
of our liberalism. We are not speaking only of an individual’s freedom to use
his mother tongue, but also of his possibility to improve it. It is at this point that
the use of the mother tongue becomes a collective right. After all, the state must
ensure education in the mother tongue for a community (a collective), in order to
enable its members to use the television, and enjoy literary institutions. The
question is; to what extent will the European state of the 21st century ensure the
exercise of this collective right?
Bicameral Parliaments and the Plurality of Identities
We cannot neglect the issue for the political representation of minorities. We are
speaking especially and particularly of the realization of the principle of
self-government. It is necessary for the preservation of minority existence to be
able to influence the apparatus of the state. This can be done in the form of street
demonstrations or even in coercive actions as had happened in Yugoslavia
between 1990 and 1999, or by using parliamentary means as in Romania and
Slovakia. I naturally support the principle of parliamentary representation for
minorities.
However, for the latter it is necessary to accept a representative system
based on a bicameral legislature. In one of the chambers, let us say, in the lower
house, representatives are elected on the basis of their party affiliations and in
the other the representatives elected by civil associations will participate. (This
could be called the senate.) Representatives of civil societies may be chosen by
local ethnic groups, religious associations, educational-, scientific-, cultural-
institutions, trade unions and other associations – even based on gender affi-
nities. There is no danger of smuggling the old feudal privileges based on birth
back into the system, as it is invoked by my friends who consider themselves
liberals. The second chamber would be designed to ensure the extension of the
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saintly principle of liberalism, namely, the freedom of the individual for self-
realization and the emergence of plural identity. We are talking here about
representatives elected by the “people”! This type of representation will provide
opportunities for the citizens to express and live their loyalties beyond party
sympathies.
Such a bicameral representative system may be created on both the state and
even village levels. During the 1980’s I only surmised that liberal practices of
representation must finally arrive at the principle of bicameral legislation. In
1999, however, while observing the confrontation of European political systems
with the emergence of social, ethnic, and other (religious, “green” etc.)
orientations, it had become my conviction that, without the realization of these
factors, the European parliamentary system will once again enter a dead end.
(As it failed after 1930, at the time of the great upsurge of social and ethnic
identities. And then came Fascism and Communism…)
*
This is the way the liberal traditions of Europe are connected in my thinking with
the new individualism, engendered by the industrial-technological revolution, eth-
nic self-government and the freedom of expression for the politics of the 21st
century. This is also the way in which my way of thinking connects the cause of
European ethnic minorities with democracy, with the principles of popular
representation, and with the modern ethics of citizenship. This is also the way in
which the future-oriented thinking and behaviour of European citizens is
connected to the research of minority life. I consider the development of the
latter important because it may strengthen a form of self-identification of the
new type of European citizenship and may also support the proud framework
of a new civil existence.
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